Australian Naval Shipbuilding Essential In So Many Ways

Comments (of 6/8/17 1:39 AM and 11/8/17 1:20 AM) below Submarine Matters' article Could Australia be Pyne's major weapons exporter? Unkikely. have prompted me to write about the advantages of building major weapon systems (eg. ships, subs, tanks and jet aircraft) in Australia. Advantages include:

-  employing workers and management in Australia rather than overseas means all their living

   expenses are spent in Australia. The resulting money multiplier effect benefits surrounding

   communities, eg. Adelaide. If living expenses are spent in Adelaide it doesn't matter if the

   workforce carry the corporate identity of Naval Group, ASC, RAN, Lockheed Martin or other

   entities.

-  providing the skills to undertake major overhauls of weapons and repair major battle damage

   in wartime building and overhauling weapons in Australia can be done more safely than exposing

   them to enemy interference on long range journeys to foreign shipyards

-  maintaining skills (like designing and welding) for other manufacturing sectors including civilian
   shipbuilding. For background here is the Australian Manufacturing website and Defence Teaming 
   Centre Inc

-  Federal money spent on weapons building in specific states promotes national unity and equity for

   disadvantaged regions or states.

-  spending large amounts of money has inherent political dimensions eg. winning sufficient Federal

   seats in South Australia enabling the Turnbull Government to win the 2016 Election.

-  a production run of weapons built in Australia creates efficiencies for each successive unit built
   with resulting economies of scale for more competitive sales to foreign countries

-  domestic production runs also spawn more competitive sales of components to foreign countries

-  exporting weapons built in Australia has terms of trade benefits and diplomate benefits (eg. Pacific

   Patrol Boat to small island nations and larger vessels to New Zealand).

Are not these arguments compelling?  

The timeline/graph above (Courtesy Defence Teaming Centre Inc), is now out of date but the "Valley of Death" concern still applies. The Valley of Death applies to the downturn in AWD shipbuilding in Adelaide 2018-2021 that will not be totally rectified by the Federal Governments project to build 2 much smaller OPVs in Adelaide. The closing of the last car factory in Adelaide in October 2017 is an example of a different manufacturing sector contributing to Adelaide's manufacturing "Valley of Death".

---

Timeline courtesy the Australian Government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan May 2017, page 15. This illustrates the continuous shipbuilding strategy which will particularly benefit South Australia, Western Australia and all other states to a lesser extent. Canberra (ACT) also benefits.

---

Naval Shipbuilding Timeline Australian Government Budget 2016-2017. This more centralised government document also demonstrates continuous shipbuilding (and also overhaul) strategy.

---

Pete

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Missiles Unviable for Australia

Running parallel to the threat of North Korean missiles to the US Guam territory issue is a sporadic, ill-informed Australian domestic debate on the viability of any Australian ballistic missile defences (BMD).

Isolated current and former Australian politicians (Abbott and Rudd respectively) advocate BMD for Australia against the North Korean threat. The Australian Government insists that Australian BMD is  technically ineffective and would be hugely expensive. 

I agree. This particularly applies to such scenarios as North Korean, Chinese or Russian ICBM nuclear warhead reentry vehicles descending on the terminal phase of their flight toward major Australian cities and military/intelligence sites. See Diagram-Map 1. below.

Diagram-Map 1. Guam already in range. NK is steadily developing ICBM to hit any targets in Australia. Darwin may already be in range. (Map courtesy The Daily Telegraph)
---

In view of physical realities and cost Australia doesn't have THAAD or Patriot missiles. One of Australia's AWDs (Air Warfare Destroyers) (HMAS Hobart) has AEGIS. Hobart is about to be commissioned and two more are being completed. None have BMD capable SM-3 missiles and might not have.

Australia best anti-missile missile hope is the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system - and that's a poor system. 

US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

The US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) BMD system goes back to Reagan era SDI "Star Wars" years and is nowhere near ready after more than US$41 Billion spent. GMD:

-  has a high failure rate, that is, a low success rate in shootdown-friendly tests,

-  would be ineffective against most enemy submarines firing nuclear tipped ballistic and cruise
   missiles from most launch positions at Australia, and
-  probably needs decades more development
-  again is extremely expensive making it perhaps of low marginal utility compared to a sovereign
   Australian nuclear deterrent

Unlike the US Australia has no overpolar (over Alaska) interceptor "chokepoint" see Diagram-Map 2 below which would increase the US chances of interception. Australia's geography, with more than 10 dispersed large cities and 10+ dispersed military/intelligence bases, would need 20+ interceptor batteries (perhaps talking 100 x GMD missiles - see below).

Diagram-Map 2.  includes the US$multi-billion giant radars deployed forward for interception of enemy ballistic missiles at their midcourse overflight "chokepoint" over Alaska. Australia has no such chokepoint but instead would need to construct 20+ interceptor batteries - a system probably more expensive than the ineffective US system. (Diagram-Map courtesy http://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/06/la-nuova-guerra-fredda-si-combatte-a-suon-di-missili/ ).

Patriot, THAAD or SM-3s located in Northeast Asia have the greatest chance of shooting down North Korean ICBMs in the early boost-phase. Australia could only send one or two AEGIS Air Warfare Destroyers, future armed with SM-3, across the world, to Northeast Asia, in the unlikely event of North Korea launching something. Australia's US, Japanese and South Korean allies are better situated for action in Northeast Asia.

The best deterrent against North Korea (like all enemy nuclear armed states) is nuclear weapons. Australia lacks its own nuclear weapons. Australia, like SK and Japan, therefore relies on their US ally's nuclear weapon deterrent.

Pete

Improvements & Higher Costs of Soryu Mark IIs Over Mark Is

Based on Anonymous comments of August 11-12, 2017 I have compiled TABLE 1 below. For an overview of the Soryu program see TABLE 2 below that:

Soryu Mark IIs are likely to cost more than US$91 million = 10 Billion (B) Yen (¥) than Soryu Mark Is, due to new:

-  LIB batteries replacing (LABs+Stirling AIP) and diesel generator sets (gensets) for greater power

   generation, and

-  sonar systems for improved detection of the enemy and for better submerged navigation-by-sonar

TABLE 1

Item/Submarine Type	Soryu Mark I	Soryu Mark II	Comments
SS order number	16SS – 26SS	27SS and 28SS	See Soryu Table below
Batteries + AIP (where applicable)	LABs + Stirling AIP	NCA LIBs [1]
Cost of batteries/Soryu in Billion Yen (¥***B) [2]	LABs ¥1.44B	NCA-LIBs ¥8.3B	LIBs per Soryu almost 6 times costs of LABs
Battery cost/performance [3]	4.5 (for 576 LABs fitted)	5.4 (for 480 LIBs fitted)
Specific energy (Wh/kg) [4]	40-60	240	LIBs have 4-6 x the specific energy of LABs
Budgeted costs per Soryu in Billion Yen [5]	26SS ¥51.7B (FY2014)	27SS ¥64.4B (FY2015) 28SS ¥63.6B (FY2016)	MK IIs ¥12-13B more than MK Is for LIBs, new snorkel generation system, gensets. Sonar system.
Costs in Soryu Mark Is [6]	gensets cost about ¥2B & sonars ¥3-4B

[1]  Soryu Mark IIs will likely be equipped with (NCA LIBs) Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide ( LiNiCoAlO₂ ) made by GS Yuasa. 

[2]  According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) the costs of LABs and NCA-LIBs are reported to be 1.44 ¥B and 8.3 ¥B, respectively. This makes NCA-LIBs just under 6 times more expensive than LABs for each Soryu sub. But, in terms of cost/performance (see [3]), NCA-LIBs are not overly expensive.

[3]  More precisely, price ratio of LAB to NCA-LIB is 4.5 and 5.4 for 576 and 480 LIBs in Soryu Mark II, respectively.

[4]  Specific energy of NCA-LIBs are 240 Wh/kg and LABs are 40-60 Wh/kg. The specific energy of NCA-LIBs are 4 to 6 times that of LABs nearly the same as the above mentioned price raitio.

[5]  Soryu Mark IIs will cost ¥12-13B more than Mark Is for LIBs, new snorkel generation system, gensets and sonar system. This suggests major enhancements in the gensets and sonars for the Soryu Mark IIs.

[6]  The Soryu Mark Is have gensets costing about ¥2B and sonars costing ¥3-4B.

 TABLE 2 - Overvie of SORYU (& Oyashio) Programs as at August 15, 2017

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi-ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First of New Class	?	?	¥76B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?

Table courtesy of exclusive information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP=air independent propulsion, LIBs=lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen.

Anonymous and Pete

Against North Korea Nuclear Deterrence Surer Than Ballistic Missile Defences

Shooting down NK ballistic missiles with AEGIS - SM-3 then THAAD in the boost phase and beginning of the mid flight phase is probably the best chance to shoot down the missiles. But still difficult to shoot down all. Shooting down single or multiple missile warheads in the terminal phase when they are plunging from space at hypersonic speeds is the most difficult time to hit them. (Map/Diagram courtesy US Missile Defense Agency, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin via CNN)

--- 

Ballistic missile defences (BMD) to defend countries ever further from North Korea (NK) include:

South Korea (SK) relies on:

-  Patriot missiles, 

-  only one battery of US THAAD missiles (more blocked by China)

-  US ship based AEGIS aiming SM-3 missiles. Several ships per US carrier group) see Submarine 

   Matters’ article in April 2017.

-  SK does have AEGIS destroyers but they do net yet have SM-3. 

-  SK lacks its own nuclear weapons - the best deterrent against NK nuclear weapons

Japan has:

-  AEGIS destroyers mounting SM-3 

-  some AEGIS armed US ships may also protect Japan.

-  Patriot missiles

-  For more complete protection Japan could purchase AEGIS ashore and/or THAAD
   (Russia opposes Japan acquiring THAAD. China may oppose THAAD for Japan also.). 

-  Japan lacks its own nuclear weapons - the best deterrent against NK nuclear weapons

Guam has:

-  THAAD

-  the US has nuclear weapons - the best deterrent against NK nuclear weapons

-  Japan’s new Defence Minister Onodera said Japan’s right of collective self-defence could legally 

    permit Japan to intercept NK ballistic missiles aimed at (or near) for Guam. But Japan's BMDs

    may be incapable of shooting down an NK missile launched for Guam.

Guam already in range. A risk is NK might aim to launch missiles near Guam but they might hit Guam by mistake - thus resulting in US retaliation. NK is steadily developing ICBM with the range to hit Australia. (Map courtesy The Daily Telegraph).

---

Australia has:

-  no SM-3, THAAD or Patriot missiles. A major reason is that they would likely be very ineffective
   against ICBM warhead re-entry vehicles once the ICBMs have reached Australian airspace from

   China, Russia or North Korea.

The US capability to extend nuclear deterrence to all of its allies (including South Korea, Japan and Australia) and its own Guam territory, has been tested as effective since 1949 (year of Russia's first nuclear test). Nuclear deterrence has existed much longer than inaccurate BMD systems.

See this very useful interactive site (on SM-3, Aegis, THAAD and Patriots) from the US DoD Missile Defense Agency.

Pete

Australia would support the US Against North Korea, Prime Minister Turnbull says.

Over the last 24 hours Australia's Prime Minister Turnbull has declared that Australia, as an ally of the US, would come to the aid of the US, if the US went to war with North Korea (NK).

Turnbull's words were "America stands by its allies, including Australia of course, and we stand by the United States...So be very, very clear on that. If there's an attack on the US, the ANZUS Treaty would be invoked and Australia would come to the aid of the United States, as America would come to our aid if we were attacked."

When Turnbull was specifically asked what would happen in the event of an attack on the US territory of Guam, Turnbull said: “We would come to the aid of the United States. Now, how that manifests itself will obviously depend on the circumstances and the consultations with our allies [which includes New Zealand under ANZUS].”

COMMENT

If NK carried out its threat to fire missiles at the US Territory of Guam this might be a trigger for a US counter-strike against NK. If NK's action is judged "an attack on the US" Australia might then send air and/or sea units to reinforce US forces facing NK.

Australian military assets that might conceivably work with US forces could include:

Aircraft, for example, Australian:

-  AP-3C Orions and/or P-8 Poseidons to patrol against NK submarines, NK ships and boats.
-  Boeing 737 (platform) E-7A Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft
-  Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aerial refueling aircraft
-  possibly Australian F/A-18/F and/or F/A-18A strike aircraft, and
-  EA-18G (Growler) electronic jamming aircraft

Perhaps ships, including:

-  2 Anzac class and/or Adelaide class frigates. 
-  Australia's first Air Warfare Destroyer, HMAS Hobart, is unlikely to be commissioned in time.
-  For the frigates' long voyage north 1 replenishment ship (HMAS Sirius or HMAS Success) 
-  Collins submarines for blocking defence, closer to Australian waters.

A form of Australian assistance to the US already is the Australian missile tracking station at Pine Gap near the town of Alice Springs, Northern Territory, Australia. Pine Gap is an Earth/ground station which works with satellites to detect North Korean, Chinese and Russian missiles being launched and helps determine their flight direction. The Gap is jointly run by Australian and US agencies.

It is still unclear what South Korea, Japan, China and Russia might do given their geographic proximity to North Korea.

Pete